Tax Reform 1985: The Quest for a Fairer, More Efficient and Simpler Income Tax by Graetz, Michael J & McDowell, Barbara
Tax Reform 1985: The Quest for a Fairer,
More Efficient and Simpler Income Tax
Michael J. Graetz*
Barbara McDowell* *
Recent reports of the demise of the federal income tax-like ear-
lier reports of Mark Twain's death-have proved to be highly exag-
gerated. Tax-reform efforts have coalesced over the past year on
the goal of restructuring the income tax to promote, as the Treasury
has put it, "fairness, simplicity and economic growth,"' rather than
replacing the income tax with a consumption tax, as had been rec-
ommended by many academics 2 and, in 1977, by the Treasury.
3
This bipartisan consensus has generated three similar, yet distinct,
proposals for a "modified flat-rate tax"-that is, a tax that imposes a
lower and less progressive rate schedule on an income-tax base that
has been broadened by the repeal of many of the tax preferences of
current law.
4
These developments should generally be applauded. They reflect
an overdue recognition of the problems that have caused the pres-
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1. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY AND Eco-
NOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT (3 volumes,
1984) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY REPORT].
2. See, e.g., Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash-Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1113 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Andrews]; INSTrrUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE
STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION, REPORT OF A COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY
PROFESSOR J.E. MEADE (1978) [hereinafter cited as MEADE REPORT]; N. KALDOR, AN Ex-
PENDITURE TAX (1955) [hereinafter cited as KALDOR].
3. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977) [herein-
after cited as BLUEPRINTS].
4. The three proposals are the TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1; The Fair Tax Act of
1985, S. 409 & H.R. 800, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced by Sen. Bill Bradley,
D-N.J., and Rep. Richard Gephardt, D-Mo.) [hereinafter cited as Bradley-Gephardt];
The Fair & Simple Tax Act of 1985, S. 325 & H.R. 777, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)
(introduced by Sen. Robert Kasten, R-Wis., and Rep. Jack Kemp, R-N.Y.) [hereinafter
cited as Kemp-Kasten]. For a further definition of a "modified flat-rate tax," see Graetz,
The 1982 Minimum Tax Amendments as a First Step in the Transition to a "Flat-Rate" Tax, 56 S.
CAL. L. REV. 527, 530-35 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Graetz, Minimum Tax]. For a fur-
ther discussion of the Bradley-Gephardt bill, see Bradley & Gephardt, Fixing the Income
Tax with the Fair Tax, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 41 (1985).
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ent income tax to become widely perceived as unfair, inefficient and
unduly complex. Moreover, they constitute an important reaffirma-
tion of the inherent superiority of an income base over a wage or
consumption base as the principal mechanism for the collection of
federal revenues.
This Article will first offer a brief overview of the three leading
proposals for a modified flat-rate tax. This analysis will necessarily
be quite general, because the reform proposals are continually be-
ing revised and refined. We will next consider why proponents of
these tax-reform proposals-including the Reagan Administration,
whose tax legislative program had previously focused almost exclu-
sively on capital formation and economic growth-have concluded
that an income tax is preferable to a consumption tax for the collec-
tion of federal revenues. We will then explore five problems of the
current income tax that must be addressed under any comprehen-
sive revision of the Internal Revenue Code: These are the problems
of tax expenditures, inflation, the role of the corporate income tax,
tax-shelter investments, and compliance. We will conclude by as-
sessing the contributions of the three reform proposals to the quest
for a fairer, more efficient and simpler income tax.
I. The Modified Flat Tax Proposals
The modified flat-rate income tax has attracted congressional sup-
port from "neo-liberal" Democrats such as Senator Bill Bradley as
well as from "supply side" Republicans such as Representative Jack
Kemp. The tax was also endorsed by the Treasury Department in its
comprehensive Report to the President on Tax Reform and is the center-
piece of the tax-reform package to be submitted to Congress by the
Reagan Administration.
The modified flat tax proposals that have thus far received the
greatest attention - the Bradley-Gephardt "Fair Tax," the Kemp-
Kasten "Fair and Simple Tax" (FAST), and the 1984 Treasury pro-
posal - share the goals of broadening the tax base and lowering tax
rates. They would cease the practice of regarding the income tax as
an all-purpose cure, like chicken soup, for every ill afflicting society.
Accordingly, they would repeal many of the exclusions, deductions
and credits that populate the current Internal Revenue Code, 5 so
that the same amount of revenues could be raised at significantly
lower tax rates. For example, the top marginal rate for individuals
5. See infra text accompanying notes 33-49.
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would be 35 percent under the Treasury proposal,6 30 percent
under Bradley-Gephardt, 7 and 24 percent under Kemp-Kasten.
8
The top marginal rate for corporations would also be reduced
under all three proposals. 9 The Treasury and Bradley-Gephardt
proposals provide, in effect, for a three-bracket rate structure to re-
place the fifteen brackets (fourteen for married couples) of current
law;' 0 the Kemp-Kasten bill, while imposing a single tax rate, would
allow for some progressivity by exempting from tax a certain
amount of earned income."
The modified flat-rate tax, according to its proponents, offers sev-
eral advantages over the current income tax. The first is greater eco-
nomic efficiency or economic neutrality. 12 A tax with fewer
preferences and lower rates than the current tax is less likely to dis-
tort economic decision-making. It is argued that people would be
less inclined under such a tax to allocate their labor and capital dif-
ferently than they would in a world without taxes.
The second advantage attributed to the modified flat tax is hori-
zontal equity,' 3 a widely used criterion that requires people in simi-
6. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 37.
7. Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at § 101.
8. Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at § 101.
9. Corporate income would be taxed at a flat rate of 33% under the Treasury propo-
sal and 30% under Bradley-Gephardt. Kemp-Kasten would tax corporations at gradu-
ated rates of 15%, 25% and 35%. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 97; Bradley-
Gephardt, supra note 4, at § 102; Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at § 102.
10. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 37; Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at
§ 101.
11. Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at §§ 102, 134. The Kemp-Kasten bill contains a
single statutory rate of 24%; however, the proposal provides for a somewhat graduated
rate structure by exempting from tax 20% of earned income up to the Social Security
ceiling ($39,600 in 1985) and then phasing out the exemption as income rises above the
ceiling amount.
12. The Treasury further defines economic neutrality as follows:
An ideal tax system would . . . interfere with private decisions as little as possible.
That is, it would not unnecessarily distort choices about how income is earned and
how it is spent. It would not unduly favor leisure over work, or consumption over
saving and investment. It would not needlessly cause business firms to modify their
production techniques or their decisions on how to finance their activities. A neutral
tax policy would not induce businesses to acquire other firms or to be acquired by
them merely for tax considerations. It would not discourage risk-taking or the for-
mation of new businesses. It would not discourage competition by granting special
preferences only to one industry or one type of financial institution.
1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
13. The Treasury, for example, defines horizontal equity as "equal treatment of
equals":
A tax that places significantly different burdens on taxpayers in similar economic
circumstances is not fair. For example, if two similar families have the same income,
they should ordinarily pay roughly the same amount of income tax, regardless of
the sources or uses of that income.
Id. at 14.
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lar circumstances to pay similar amounts of tax. The tax would
repeal current provisions that allow some taxpayers to reduce their
tax liability because of the sources of their income or the types of
their expenditures. Finally, a modified flat tax is regarded as an op-
portunity to simplify substantially the operation of the income tax. 
14
The proponents of the three tax-reform proposals appear to differ
as to the relative priority that they accord the dual goals of base
broadening and rate reduction. The authors of the Bradley-
Gephardt bill seem to be concerned primarily with the repeal of ex-
isting tax preferences, particularly the favorable treatment of capital
gains. They appear to have concluded that such broadening of the
tax base can win political acceptance only if it is coupled with reduc-
ing the top tax rate on all forms of income to a level roughly compa-
rable to the current top rate on capital gains. The authors of the
Kemp-Kasten and Treasury proposals, on the other hand, seem to
be concerned primarily with lowering tax rates to encourage savings
and capital formation. They appear to have recognized that a rate
reduction is achievable only if the tax base can be broadened
substantially. 15
Attempting to analyze these proposals in detail is like attempting
to hit a rapidly moving target. As Treasury Secretary Donald Regan
emphasized upon the release of the Treasury plan: "This thing was
written on a word processor. It can be changed."' 16 Indeed, the pro-
posal reportedly will be changed in several significant respects
before it is formally submitted to Congress. 17 The Kemp-Kasten
and Bradley-Gephardt bills have likewise undergone several revi-
sions since they were originally introduced. Moreover, no flat tax
proposal has yet been voted upon by a single congressional commit-
14. The Treasury observes that "though simplicity in taxation may be difficult to
define, everyone knows what it is not":
Simplicity is not reflected in a tax system that requires extensive recordkeeping by
ordinary citizens. . . .Simplicity is not computing dozens of deductions and cred-
its, and wondering all the while whether other means of saving tax might have been
missed through ignorance of the laws. Nor is simplicity being forced to wade
through long and complicated instruction booklets or resort to professional assist-
ance, in order to meet the civic responsibility to pay taxes.
Id. at 15-16.
15. Compare B. BRADLEY, THE FAIR TAx 90 (1984) ("It is clear that the biggest prob-
lem with our income tax is the mass of tax loopholes.") with Kemp Says Economic Growth
Should Be Motive Behind Tax Reform, 26 TAx NOTES 736 (1985) (quoting Rep. Kemp as
having said that the purpose of tax reform should be to improve economic growth by
encouraging capital investment).
16. Kilborn, A Bargaining Chip, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1984, at AI, col. 5.
17. Blustein, Baker's Tax Proposal Seen Easier Than Regan's Concerning Depreciation, Capi-
tal Gains, Fringes, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1985, at 62, col. 1.
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tee, let alone by the full House and Senate. It is highly unlikely that
any of the current plans will emerge unaltered from the legislative
process. 18
The purpose of this Article is therefore not to compare and con-
trast one flat tax against another. Instead, it is to explore some gen-
eral lessons that can be derived from seventy years of experience
under the income tax and that will remain important regardless of
which tax-reform plan, if any, is ultimately enacted into law. The
most important of these lessons is reflected in the bipartisan rejec-
tion of a consumption tax as a replacement for the income tax.
II. The Rejection of the Consumption Tax
The consumption tax emerged in recent years as the leading con-
tender to replace the income tax as the nation's major revenue
source. 19 Such a tax could take one of three forms: a retail sales tax,
a value-added tax, or a personal progressive consumption tax (often
labeled an expenditure tax).20 Proponents of a consumption tax
have chiefly emphasized its supposed superiority to an income tax in
providing incentives for savings and investment, 2' although some
have also stressed its greater simplicity22 and ability to cope with
inflation. 23 It is therefore particularly significant that even the Rea-
18. For a discussion of the tax legislative process, see Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax,
Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L. J. 259, 263-69 (1983) (noting increased influence of special
interests in guiding tax policy decisions) [hereinafter cited as Graetz, Estate Tax]; Graetz,
Reflections on the Tax Legislative Process: Prelude to Reform, 58 VA. L. REV. 1389 (1972).
19. See sources cited supra note 2. For further analysis of consumption-tax propos-
als, see Graetz, Can the Income Tax Continue to Be the Major Revenue Source?, in OPTIONs FOR
TAX REFORM 39 (J. Pechman ed. 1984) (Brookings Institution) [hereinafter cited as
Graetz, Income Tax];J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 183-205 (1983); Warren, Would a
Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L. J. 1081 (1980); Graetz, Imple-
menting a Progressive Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Graetz, Consumption Tax].
20. A sales tax, such as those commonly imposed by state and local governments, is
generally collected only at the retail level; in contrast, a value-added tax, such as those
imposed by a number of European countries, is collected at each stage of the manufac-
turing and distribution process. An expenditure tax could be imposed much like the
present income tax; however, the tax base would include amounts borrowed and would
exclude amounts saved or invested. See 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 213-14.
21. See, e.g., KALDOR, supra note 2, at 14 (asserting that an expenditure tax, unlike an
income tax, "does not discriminate against either savings or risk bearing"). See also An-
drews, supra note 2, at 1173 ("it seems to be assumed that the net effect of the shift
toward a consumption base would favor saving").
22. See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 2, at 165 (asserting that, on balance, a consumption
tax "would represent an incomparably simpler tax to administer" than the current in-
come tax).
23. See, e.g., MEADE REPORT, supra note 2, at 186-87 (contending that "[o]ne of the
main advantages of a [consumption tax] is that it would be immeasurably easier to cope
properly with tax problems arising from inflation").
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gan Administration, which from the outset has sought to use the tax
system to encourage capital formation and economic growth, has
rejected the consumption tax in favor of a modified income tax.
24
One basic reason to prefer an income tax over a consumption tax
is that a broad consumption-tax base is inherently smaller than a
broad income-tax base. This fact is made clear by reference to
Henry Simons's famous definition of income as consumption plus
accretions to wealth:25 An income tax includes income in the base
whether spent or saved, while a consumption tax omits accretions
from the base and thereby taxes income only if spent. The same
point may be illustrated by the equality, under certain conditions, of
a consumption base and a wage base.26 The fact that a consumption
tax tends to exempt income from capital, while an income tax
reaches both income from labor and income from capital, suggests
that a consumption tax may produce not only less revenue but also
more unfairness than an income tax.
Since an income base is naturally broader than a consumption
base, an income tax has the potential to raise more revenue at the
same rates or to raise the same revenue at lower rates. This may
prove no small advantage to a government confronted with projec-
tions of huge current and future deficits. The revenue potential of a
consumption tax might also be limited by two other factors: First,
24. The Treasury conceded that a personal consumption tax might prove superior
to an income tax in terms of encouraging savings and eliminating the difficulties that
currently arise in the measurement of income from business and capital. A consumption
tax was nonetheless rejected because of (1) the equity and efficiency costs of excluding
all capital income from tax; (2) the disruption of international taxation that would result
so long as other nations continued to impose a tax on income rather than consumption;
(3) the greater complexity that would arise in the taxation of individuals; (4) transitional
difficulties, especially those involving the taxation of consumption from after-tax savings
that had been accumulated before the adoption of the consumption tax; and (5) uncer-
tainty over the proper treatment of gifts and bequest under a consumption tax. 1 TREAS-
URY REPORT, supra note 1, at 211-12. The Treasury likewise rejected a national retail
sales or value-added tax as a full or partial replacement for the current income tax be-
cause such a tax would be inherently regressive, would intrude into an area of taxation
traditionally reserved for states and localities; would impose high administration and
compliance costs; and would be likely to lead to an increase in overall government
spending. Id. at 226-27.
25. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
26. See Graetz, Consumption Tax, supra note 19, at 1598; Warren, supra note 19, at 5.
This equivalence of a consumption base and a wage base derives from the equivalence of
allowing an immediate deduction for the cost of an investment and of imposing tax
initially but exempting from tax the income from the investment. This "immediate-
deduction/yield-exemption equivalence" was first recognized by E. Cary Brown in the
article, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME, EMPLOYMENT AND PUB-
LIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSON 300-16 (1948). See also Committee on
Simplification, ABA Section of Taxation, Complexity and Personal Consumption Tax, 35 TAX
LAw. 415, 433 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Committee on Simplification].
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under a consumption tax, there would be no justification for any
separate corporate tax (other than a withholding tax). 27 Second, a
consumption tax, unlike an income tax, should be imposed on a tax-
exclusive base-in other words, a deduction should be allowed for
the tax itself.28 Today's top tax-inclusive income-tax rate of 50 per-
cent is equivalent to a tax-exclusive rate of 100 percent, and the pre-
1981 top rate of 70 percent is equivalent to a tax-exclusive rate of
233 1/3 percent. It is unlikely that tax-exclusive rates of 100 percent
or greater would be acceptable to the public notwithstanding their
equivalence to currently accepted tax-inclusive rates.
29
An even more important reason for rejecting the consumption tax
as a substitute for the income tax is that it fails to distribute the costs
of government fairly based on taxpayers' relative abilities to pay.3
0
A system that taxes only wages or consumption fails to take into
account ability to pay due to the accumulation of capital or income
27. This is because corporations are engaged in production, not consumption.
Amounts earned by businesses and retained for investment would be exempt from the
consumption tax as would amounts earned and invested by individuals. The tax would
be imposed only when corporate earnings were distributed to shareholders and used by
them for consumption rather than savings or investment. This poses the transitional
problem of whether to tax consumption of wealth accumulated in after-tax dollars under
the income tax. See Graetz, Consumption Tax, supra note 19, at 1634-42; Committee on
Simplification, supra note 26, at 439.
28. The failure to allow a deduction for the consumption tax itself would create dis-
parities in the amount due depending on the timing of deductible investments as op-
posed to the timing of estimated or actual tax payments. For example, individuals whose
tax was underwithheld could invest the amount that would eventually become due and
thereby obtain deductions unavailable to individuals whose tax was overwithheld. See
Graetz, Consumption Tax, supra note 19, at 1582-84.
29. The revenue potential, as well as the fairness, of the consumption tax might be
increased by including bequests and gifts in the tax base of the donor. This would be
inconsistent with consumption tax principles, however, since the donee rather than the
donor would spend the amount of the bequest or gift. Moreover, taxing bequests as
consumption would seem to have little practical prospect of enactment. It has been sug-
gested for similar reasons that the replacement of the income tax with a consumption
tax be coupled with either the significant strengthening of the the estate and gift tax or
the imposition of a periodic low-rate wealth tax. The estate and gift tax is incapable of
raising a significant share of federal revenues, however, and is extremely unpopular
among many segments of the public. A wealth tax is widely viewed as impractical be-
cause of valuation and liquidity problems; moreover, a wealth tax is a "direct" tax that
could not be imposed without a constitutional amendment or a constitutionally effective
disguise. See Graetz, Income Tax, supra note 19, at 40-41; Graetz, Estate Tax, supra note 18,
at 284-85. See also Aaron & Galper, Reforming the Tax Structure in ECONOMIC CHOICES
1984 87, 94 (Rivlin ed. 1984) (Brookings Institution) (proposal for a consumption tax,
which the authors label a "lifetime income tax," that would include gifts and bequests in
the tax base).
30. U.S. tax policy has been guided throughout the twentieth century by the funda-
mental principle that tax burdens should be distributed in accordance with people's abil-
ity to pay. See, e.g, Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44, 45-46
(1967) (ability to pay provides "a general index of economic well-being which broadly
measures a person's capacity to contribute or to 'sacrifice' on behalf of government.").
Yale Law & Policy Review
from capital. Indeed, the recognition that fairness requires the taxa-
tion of both labor and capital income motivated the adoption of the
sixteenth amendment, 3' which ensured that Congress would pos-
sess the same taxing power over investment income as it was already
conceded to possess over labor income and business profits.3 2 The
new modified flat tax proposals may therefore be viewed as a reaffir-
mation of the sixteenth amendment and of the appropriateness of
taxing investment income.
Moreover, if the federal income tax were to be replaced with a
consumption tax in its most common form-that is, a retail sales tax
or a value-added tax-the tax burden on low- and middle-income
individuals would increase relative to the burden on upper-income
individuals. Finally, whereas the income tax imposes its greatest
burden on the taxpayer's high-earning years, typically the middle
years, a consumption tax would impose its greatest burden on the
low-earning, high-consumption years of youth and old age.
The proponents of a modified flat tax have, by rejecting a con-
sumption base in favor of an income base, implicitly recognized that
exempting capital or capital income from tax is neither permitted by
considerations of tax equity nor compelled by considerations of eco-
nomic efficiency or economic growth. Instead, they have sought an
income tax that does not distort economic behavior as much as does
the present tax but that still imposes a rate of taxation on capital or
capital income that exceeds the zero rate that would prevail under a
consumption tax. In short, they have correctly recognized that the
income tax needs restructuring, not repeal. We will now turn to
those aspects of the current income tax that most require such
revision.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
32. The Supreme Court held in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429
(1895), that an earlier income tax was unconstitutional to the extent that it taxed income
derived from real estate and municipal bonds. On rehearing, the Court found the entire
income tax to be unconstitutional because it consisted in too large part of a direct tax on
property income that was not apportioned among the states in conformity with the Con-
stitution. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). As Boris Bittker
has observed:
The Pollock case is often described as a "judicial veto" preventing Congress from
taxing income until the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted in 1913. In point of fact,
however, the decision intimated that a tax on salaries, wages, and business profits
would not be a "direct tax" and hence would not have to be apportioned, thus
leaving Congress free to tax income from these sources if it was willing to exempt
unearned income.
1 B. BITrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFrs 1.2.2 (1981).
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III. The Problem of Tax Expenditures
The federal government has since 1974 explicitly recognized the
existence of "tax expenditures" that represent departures from the
"normal structure" of the individual and corporate income taxes. 33
Tax expenditures are defined generally as provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code that allow special exclusions, deductions, deferrals
or credits to encourage particular economic activities or to benefit
particular categories of taxpayers. Considerable controversy re-
mains, however, over precisely which items should be included in
the annual "tax expenditure budget."
34
The 104 provisions identified as "tax expenditures" in fiscal 1982
were estimated to constitute about 41 percent of the total federal
revenue that would otherwise have been collected and about 8.4
percent of the gross national product.3 5 Most of these preferential
provisions are of long standing. Richard Goode has found, for ex-
ample, that 83 percent of the estimated revenue cost of tax expendi-
tures in 1982 resulted from provisions at least thirty-five years old
and that 95 percent resulted from provisions enacted before 1970.36
The recent increases in the "tax expenditure budget" are therefore
attributable not so much to new provisions as to greater use of old
provisions.
The three reform plans recognize that the tax base can be broad-
ened, and tax rates can be reduced, only if many of these tax ex-
penditures are eliminated. Consequently, all three plans would, for
example, repeal the investment tax credit,3 7 the percentage deple-
33. The annual accounting for "tax expenditures" was mandated by the Congres-
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 601, 31
U.S.C. § 1105(a)(16) (1982).
34. Compare Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 11
NAT'L TAXJ. 244 (1969), with Surrey & Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget - Response to
Professor Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAXJ. 528 (1969). The issue of whether the Accelerated Cost
Recovery System constituted a tax expenditure was debated in the early 1980s by Stan-
ley Surrey and Norman Ture, who was then the Undersecretary of the Treasury. Compare
Ture's Unreleased Testimony, 13 TAX NOTES 1538 (1981) (Ture contends that "any depreci-
ation method which does not afford instantaneous write-off is a negative tax expendi-
ture") with 1983 Budget Makes Major Changes in Tax Expenditure Budget, 14 TAX NOTES 420
(1982) (Surrey counters that it would be "theoretically wrong" to exclude ACRS from
the tax expenditure budget).
35. Goode, Lessons from Seven Decades ofIncome Taxation, in OPrIONs FOR TAX REFORM
13, 19 (J. Pechman ed. 1984) (Brookings Institution). In contrast, tax expenditures con-
stituted only 25% of federal revenues and 4.6% of GNP in 1971. Id.
36. Id. at 19-20.
37. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 173-75; Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at
§ 201; Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at § 201.
Yale Law & Policy Review
tion allowances for oil, gas and mineral resources,38 and the tax ex-
emption for private-purpose bonds issued by state and local
governments.39 The plans differ concerning the elimination of
other provisions that have often been characterized as tax expendi-
tures. For example, each plan would impose different restrictions on
the deductibility of charitable contributions, 40 state and local
taxes,4' and non-business interest expense.42 The proposals like-
wise differ with respect to the treatment of various employee fringe
benefits that are exempt from the current income tax.
43
It is particularly noteworthy that the Treasury and Bradley-
Gephardt proposals would eliminate the preferential treatment of
all capital gains. 44 The Kemp-Kasten bill would retain a reduced
38. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 229-31; Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at
§ 311; Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at § 311.
39. 2 TREASURY REPOR-t, supra note 1, at 289-92; Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at
§ 215; Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at § 215.
40. The Treasury would retain the deduction only for charitable contributions in
excess of 2% of gross income, limit the deduction to the indexed basis of appreciated
property, repeal the 50% and 30% limits on individual contributions, and repeal the
deduction for non-itemizers. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 69-80. Bradley-
Gephardt would allow charitable deductions, like other personal deductions, only to off-
set income taxable at the 14% rate; corporations would be allowed to deduct only 50%
of their charitable contributions. Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at §§ 202, 234. Kemp-
Kasten would retain the charitable deduction provisions of current law.
41. The Treasury would repeal the itemized deduction for state and local taxes; such
taxes could continue to be deducted, however, if they were incurred in business or other
income-producing activity. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 62-65. Bradley-
Gephardt would retain the deduction for state and local income and real property taxes,
but would repeal the deduction for state and local personal property and general sales
taxes. Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at § 233. Kemp-Kasten would retain the deduc-
tion for state and local taxes on real property, but would repeal the deduction for state
and local income, sales and personal property taxes. Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at
§ 226.
42. The Treasury would allow the deduction of non-business interest expense only
to the extent that it did not exceed the sum of home-mortgage interest, investment in-
come and $5,000. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 331-33. Bradley-Gephardt would
allow the deduction of home mortgage interest and other non-business interest to the
extent of net investment income. Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at § 232. Kemp-Kas-
ten would allow the deduction for interest on home mortgages and student loans but
not on other consumer debt. Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at § 228.
43. For example, the Treasury would limit to a specified amount the exclusion of
health insurance premiums paid by an employer on behalf of an employee and would
repeal the exclusion of employer-provided dependent care, transportation, educational
assistance, legal services, death benefits, group-term life insurance and the special treat-
ment of cafeteria plans. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 23-40. The Bradley-
Gephardt and Kemp-Kasten bills would repeal only some of these provisions. See Brad-
ley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at §§ 211, 212, 216 (repeal of exclusions for employer-pro-
vided transportation, cafeteria plans, dependent care assistance, group-term life
insurance; limitations on exclusion of employer contributions to accident and health
plans); Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at § 211 (repeal of exclusions for employer-provided
compensation for injuries and sickness, group legal service plans, transportation).




capital-gains rate for corporations and for individuals who elected
not to index the basis of their assets. 45 The Treasury, in calling for
the repeal of the capital-gains preference, recited the concerns for
economic neutrality that are embodied in the concept of tax
expenditures:
Along with other provisions that establish special tax treatment for
particular sources and uses of income, the preferential tax rate for cap-
ital gains is one of an elaborate series of tax incentives for particular
businesses and investments. These incentives impede the efficiency of
an economy based on free market principles. This undeclared govern-
ment industrial policy largely escapes public scrutiny, yet it increas-
ingly controls the form and content of business and investment
activity.4
6
It is also significant that the three plans retain the preferential tax
treatment of retirement savings through the deferred pension and
profit-sharing plans and individual retirement accounts that to-
gether constitute the principal form of savings for many middle-in-
come taxpayers. 47 The income earned on these investments should,
as a theoretical matter, be taxed currently under a comprehensive
income tax.48 There are good reasons, however, for allowing the
tax-free accumulation of a substantial amount of such income until
retirement, even though the current law in this area could be some-
what improved. The deferral of tax provides a useful lifetime aver-
aging effect and mitigates significantly the natural preference of the
income tax for current over deferred consumption.
In sum, the three reform proposals point in the proper direction
with respect to the longstanding problem of tax expenditures. To
recognize the need to repeal many tax expenditures is one thing,
however, and to overcome the political and transitional obstacles to
doing so is quite another. Many tax expenditures that serve useful
social functions could probably not be replaced by direct expendi-
45. Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at § 232. Kemp-Kasten would allow individual tax-
payers either to exclude from gross income 40% of their net capital gain or to adjust the
basis of their capital assets upward to compensate for inflation.
46. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 180-81.
47. See 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 161 (observing that all three proposals
leave essentially intact the present tax treatment of individual retirement accounts, Ke-
ogh plans, qualified pension plans and profit-sharing plans). Many of the current provi-
sions governing such plans are contained in I.R.C. §§ 219, 401-418E (1982).
48. For example, the Treasury proposed in 1977 that, under a comprehensive in-
come tax, the earnings of pension plans should be taxed as they accrued, either to the
employer or to the employee. The proposal would have continued to exclude employ-
ers' contributions to pension plans from employees' tax bases until received, however,
and to allow employees a deduction for their own contributions. See BLUEPRINTS, supra
note 3, at 56.
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tures in the current political and fiscal climate. This inhibition may
well prove fatal to a variety of specific base-broadening proposals.
Moreover, it remains to be seen whether Congress can muster the
political courage to eliminate even those tax-expenditure provisions
that are widely conceded to have outlived their usefulness; any at-
tempt to do so would most likely encounter strong opposition from
their beneficiaries, who have come to regard certain tax expendi-
tures almost as their vested right. A compromise solution might be
to delay or to phase-in the termination of those tax-expenditure
provisions whose repeal would impose particularly large losses on
particularly vulnerable categories of taxpayers. 49
IV. Inflation and the Income Tax
The current income tax was designed for a world of stable prices.
The income tax, while perhaps able to withstand inflation that oc-
curs at a low, regular or predictable rate, has been undermined by
the high, fluctuating and unpredictable inflation rates of recent
years. 50 It has consequently produced bizarre patterns of undertax-
ation and overtaxation that have affected most borrowers and lend-
ers as well as most owners of capital assets.
There are three ways in which the income tax has been seriously
affected by fluctuating and unpredictable rates of inflation. These
are the problems of "bracket creep," the mismeasurement of in-
come from capital, and the increased importance of timing.
Inflation has distorted the dollar amounts specified in the pro-
gressive rate schedules and elsewhere in the Internal Revenue
Code. As a result, workers experienced bracket creep throughout
the 1970s whenever they received cost-of-living raises that did not
increase their real spending power but that pushed them into higher
tax brackets. Congress dealt with this problem in 1981 by enacting
indexing provisions that, beginning in 1985, adjust the personal ex-
emptions, zero bracket amount and rate schedules annually to re-
flect increases in the consumer price index.5'
49. For further discussion of transitional issues, see infra text accompanying note
147.
50. For further discussion of the effects of inflation on the income tax, see J.
PECHMAN, supra note 19, at 107-09. See also 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 17;
INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX (H. Aaron ed. 1976); Von Furstenberg, Individual Income
Taxation and Inflation, 28 NAT'L TAXJ. 117 (1975); Note, Inflation and the Federal Income
Tax, 82 YALE L J. 716 (1973). See generally 1 B. BITrIER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS 3.5.4 (1981).
51. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 104, I.R.C. §§ 151(f),
I(f), amending § 63(d) (1982).
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The failure of Congress to respond earlier to the problem of
bracket creep, however, may have taken a lasting toll on the income
tax. Many citizens came to question the fairness of a tax that each
year claimed a larger share of the same amount of real income.
52
Moreover, bracket creep, by subjecting more and more of the popu-
lation to higher marginal rates, encouraged investment in tax shel-
ters by increasing the value of tax preferences and structural
distortions in the measurement of income.
The second way in which inflation has affected the income tax has
been in distorting the measurement of income from capital. Net in-
come is mismeasured whenever an amount spent or incurred in an
earlier year's dollars must be offset against an amount received or
earned in a later year's inflated dollars. These distortions affect the
size of capital gains and losses, depreciation allowances, accounting
for inventories, and the tax treatment of debt, particularly misalloca-
tions between interest and principal.
Congress has generally responded to this mismeasurement of
capital income not with systematic solutions but instead with ad hoc
"tinkering" such as the 1978 increase in the capital-gains exclu-
sion53 and the 1981 acceleration of depreciation deductions. 54 Pro-
visions such as these have served, in effect, to impose a zero rate of
tax on income from important categories of assets; these include
equipment, which essentially enjoys the equivalent of immediate ex-
pensing through a combination of accelerated cost recovery deduc-
tions and the investment tax credit; natural resources exploration
and development, where immediate expensing is generally permit-
ted; and real estate, which often produces negative income-tax
rates. 55 These rules have produced tax burdens that vary widely
52. See Goode, supra note 35, at 18-19. The author observes:
Only recently did the unfavorable view of the income tax become the opinion of a
plurality of citizens. . . . A likely cause of the abrupt decline in the public opinion
rating of the individual income tax after 1972 was its interaction with inflation.
Over the years 1972-83, the consumer price index rose by 138 percent, more than it
had increased from the end of World War II up to 1972. With personal exemptions
and nominal rates in the federal income tax unchanged in 1972-78, the decline in
the real value of the exemptions and bracket creep caused the taxes of many per-
sons to increase faster than their real income.
Id. at 18. See also Henry, Noncompliance with U.S. Tax Law--Evidence on Size, Growth, and
Composition, 37 TAx LAw. 1, 53 (1983).
53. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 402, amending I.R.C. § 1202. (1982).
54. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201, I.R.C. § 168
(1982).
55. It has been estimated that as much as 80% of the $10.5 trillion of assets held by
individuals qualifies for preferential treatment under the current income tax. See Galper
& Steuerle, Tax Incentives for Savings, 2 BROOKINGs REV. 1, 19-20 (1983).
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both among industries and among companies within the same in-
dustry and have thereby produced inequities and encouraged the
inefficient allocation of resources.
Meanwhile, Congress has failed to address, even in a piecemeal
fashion, the problems of inflation with respect to debt. Interest in-
come and expense are overstated in inflationary periods because in-
terest rates often include an inflation premium to compensate
lenders for the anticipated decline in the value of their principal.
Consequently, taxable lenders tend to be overtaxed, because some
of their nominal interest income represents principal rather than in-
terest, while borrowers tend to be undertaxed, because their de-
ductible interest expense includes the inflation premium as well as
real interest.
Congress seems to have rationalized its neglect of this problem
on the simplistic ground that the undertaxation of debtors will
somehow in the aggregate be compensated for by the overtaxation
of creditors. In fact, taxable institutional lenders, such as banks and
insurance companies, can shelter much of their overstated income,
while tax-exempt lenders, such as pension funds and university en-
dowment funds, are indifferent to income overstatement. The re-
luctance of Congress to adjust the taxation of debt to account for
inflation undoubtedly reflects the political reality that borrowers are
far more numerous than lenders in every legislative district. It may
also reflect the position of influential economists that the overtaxa-
tion of assets, because of its inhibiting effect on capital formation,
should be given priority over the overtaxation and undertaxation of
debt. 5
6
The failure of Congress to adopt a systematic solution to the mis-
measurement of capital income during periods of inflation has given
rise to an income tax that is incapable of measuring the income of
asset owners, debtors or creditors. Indeed, the wrong tax burden
has been imposed on virtually every individual and corporation in a
society that has universally ignored Polonius' admonition to refrain
from both borrowing and lending. The current income tax thus
provides great incentives for undertaxed assets to be held by taxpay-
ers subject to the highest marginal rates and for overtaxed assets
(such as loans that produce taxable interest) to be held by low-
56. See, e.g., INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX, supra note 50, at 328 (economist Martin
Feldstein was reported to have remarked that, while he would prefer the indexing of




bracket taxpayers and tax-exempt entities. 57 It has also encouraged
the same taxpayer simultaneously to engage in debt and asset trans-
actions where the asset is eligible for favored tax treatment.
The opportunities for taxpayers to engage in such "tax arbitrage"
have been enhanced by structural provisions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code. A number of these provisions were enacted in an simpler
era to distinguish owners from borrowers, for example, and to dis-
tinguish one form of legal entity from another. The innovative use
of these provisions has resulted in the formation of large and even
publicly owned limited partnerships that can "pass through" their
tax losses to offset their investors' unrelated income, 58 the issuing of
zero-coupon bonds by taxable borrowers to tax-exempt lenders, 59
equipment and real estate leasing by loss corporations and tax-ex-
empt entities, 60 family sale-leaseback transactions, 61 and the spin-off
57. For a further discussion of such tax arbitrage, see Steuerle, Tax Arbitrage, Inflation,
and the Taxation of Interest Payments and Receipts, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 991 (1984).
58. For a discussion of the tax treatment of limited partnerships and the problems
that have resulted from such treatment, see 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 146-48.
The Treasury contends that the current law is inadequate in distinguishing corpora-
tions, which are usually taxed as separate entities, from large limited partnerships, which
can pass through items of income and loss to their partners.
59. Zero-coupon bonds are bonds that pay no stated interest; the investor purchases
the bond at a discount and redeems it for its face value at maturity. The Internal Reve-
nue Code requires that a portion of this discount be treated as interest income or ex-
pense each year even though no interest is actually paid until maturity. Prior to 1982,
such interest income and expense was allocated ratably over the life of the indebtedness;
now this interest is subject to an "economic accrual" method that reflects the com-
pounding of interest. The earlier treatment was advantageous to taxable issuers, who
could obtain overstated deductions long before they had to make payments on the
bonds, but disadvantageous to taxable investors, who had to pay tax on overstated in-
come that they had not yet received. Tax-exempt entities and Individual Retirement
Accounts, which are indifferent to these rules, have consequently become the leading
purchasers of zero-coupon bonds. See I.R.C. §§ 1271-75 (West Supp. 1984). See also M.
GRAETZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, ch. 6 (1985).
60. Leasing transactions have often been designed to permit highly taxed corpora-
tions essentially to purchase the tax benefits-especially the accelerated depreciation
deductions and the investment tax credits-of tax-exempt entities and loss corporations.
See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) (real-estate sale-leaseback
). Congress facilitated such transactions with respect to equipment leasing by enacting
the "safe-harbor" lease provisions of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L.
No. 97-34, § 201(0(8), I.R.C. § 168(f)(8) (1982). New restrictions were imposed on such
transactions in 1982, however, as a result of concern at the sizable tax savings realized
by profitable corporations such as General Electric and Occidental Petroleum as a result
of safe-harbor leasing. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
248, §§ 208, 209, I.R.C. § 168(i) (1982). In addition, the benefits of engaging in sale-
leasebacks with tax-exempt entities were significantly reduced by the Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 31(a), I.R.C. § 168(j) (West Supp. 1984). See M.
GRAETZ, supra note 59, at ch. 4. See also Warren & Auerbach, Tax Policy and Equipment
Leasing after TEFRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1579 (1983); Warren & Auerbach, Transferability of
Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1752 (1982).
61. The purpose of family sale-leasebacks and gift-leasebacks is primarily to shift
income-producing property from family members in high tax brackets to family mem-
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of corporate assets into royalty trusts. 62
The third important effect of inflation on the income tax is to
magnify dramatically the significance of timing issues. High interest
rates, which have been correlated with inflation, and high effective
tax rates have raised substantially the tax stakes of allocating deduc-
tions to earlier taxable years and income to later taxable years. In
labeling issues of income tax timing as trivial in 1938, Henry Simons
clearly marked himself as a man before our time.63 Even in more
recent years, however, Congress has seemed to concur in that judg-
ment, routinely justifying decisions to accelerate deductions or to
delay income recognition as "only a matter of timing." The distinc-
tion between life and death is also "only a matter of timing."
The belated nature of concern for issues of income-tax timing is
amply evidenced by the fact that it was not until 1982 that Congress
discovered compound interest. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Respon-
sibility Act of 1982 required, for the first time, the use of compound
interest in measuring interest income on bonds originally issued at a
discount 64 and in calculating interest on tax underpayments. 65 Tax
planners have been aware for some time of the dramatic impact on
bers in lower tax brackets. These transactions may also create deductions for highly
taxed transferors; for example, a taxpayer who transfers fully depreciated office equip-
ment to his daughter might seek to obtain rental deductions when he leases it back from
her. See, e.g., Hudspeth v. Commissioner, 509 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1975) (upholding sale-
leaseback of farmland between farm couple and their children); Rosenfeld v. Commis-
sioner, 706 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1983) (allowing gift-leaseback of office building between
doctor and his children). See also M. GRAETZ, supra note 59, at ch. 4.
62. The primary motive behind spin-offs of corporate assets is to transfer to share-
holders future income to be earned by the assets and thereby to avoid tax on the income
at the corporate level. See, e.g., Hineman, Oil and Gas Investments, 1 TAX. OF INVESTMENTS
250 (1984) (oil and gas royalty trusts); Cole, Mobil Asks U.S. Ruling on a Trust, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 17, 1984, at D1, col. 6 (request for IRS ruling on plan to give stockholders
$1.5 billion in future royalties from oil-producing properties).
63. H. SIMoNs, supra note 25, at 168-69. Simons observed, in defense of generally
taxing capital gains only when realized, that
[elnjoying large gains, realizable but unrealized, one could in effect borrow from
the treasury without interest, sometimes for many years. While this possibility indi-
cates a significant difference between the "ideal" method of calculating taxable in-
come and the modified realization procedure, there would seem to be no serious
inequities involved in adherence to the methods which practical considerations so
strongly dictate. . . . Moreover, the treasury is protected in most cases against
abuse of the postponement opportunities, for. . . [w]hat a man may gain by post-
poning realization will ordinarily be offset, or more than offset, under progressive
rates, by the piling-up of taxable income in his later years or in the hands of his
estate.
Id.
64. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 231
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1272 (West Supp. 1984)).
65. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 344,
I.R.C. § 6622 (1982).
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tax liabilities of compound, as opposed to simple, interest, espe-
cially in periods of high interest rates; for example, $10,000 grows
in thirty years to $55,000 at 15 percent simple interest but to
$662,100 when the interest is compounded.66 '
The Treasury proposal is the first to recognize that the income tax
must correct systematically for the mismeasurement of income that
results from the fluctuating and unpredictable inflation rates that
have become a fact of economic life in the United States. In con-
trast, the Bradley-Gephardt and Kemp-Kasten bills offer half-way
solutions that fail to address the problem of inflation
comprehensively.
Bracket creep would become a less significant problem under the
flattened rate structures provided by the three reform plans. Conse-
quently, the Bradley-Gephardt bill would not adjust tax brackets for
inflation, 67 while the Treasury and Kemp-Kasten proposals would
continue to do So.68 The benefits to be obtained from shifting in-
come to lower-bracket taxpayers, and deductions to higher-bracket
taxpayers, would also be reduced under a flatter rate structure. The
Treasury would further discourage income shifting by taxing chil-
dren's unearned income at their parents' marginal rate 69 and by tax-
ing trust income either to the grantor, to the beneficiaries, to the
trust at the grantor's marginal rate or to the trust at the highest indi-
vidual rate. 70
The Treasury would reduce the overstatement (or, in the case of
borrowers, the understatement) of net income in periods of infla-
tion by indexing the basis of capital assets, vi inventories, 72 deprecia-
tion deductions 73 and indebtedness. 74 The Treasury has concluded
that such indexing would permit the accurate measurement of in-
come regardless of the inflation rate and therefore would eliminate
the need for "ad hoc" inflation adjustments such as the Accelerated
Cost Recovery System and the preferential treatment of capital
gains. 75 The repeal of ACRS would, in turn, eliminate many timing
66. This example is adapted from Canellos & Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound In-
terest: Interest Deferral and Discount After 1982, 38 TAx L. REV. 565, 565 (1983).
67. Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at § 121.
68. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 155; Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at §§ 112,
121.
69. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 92-95.
70. Id. at 96-106.
71. Id. at 178-88.
72. Id. at 189-92.
73. Id. at 152-72.
74. Id. at 193-200.
75. Id. at 181.
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advantages associated with taking depreciation deductions in years
before they are economically appropriate.
The indexing of both assets and debt presents many technical dif-
ficulties that policymakers have only begun to consider. The Treas-
ury would attempt to avoid the inherent complexity of annually
indexing the basis of assets and debt, for example, by instead index-
ing the basis of assets only at the time of sale and by reducing inter-
est income and expense each year by a fraction based upon the
inflation rate. These shortcuts would produce unintended distor-
tions in the measurement of income. For example, financial institu-
tions, which can fully protect themselves against inflation by holding
assets equal to debt and by charging higher interest rates than they
pay to their depositors, would enjoy an enormous unwarranted tax
reduction under the Treasury's proposal.
Indexing interest income but not other forms of passive income
would also produce new pressures on the need to distinguish inter-
est from rent or dividends-that is, loans from leases and debt from
equity. Moreover, the Treasury's indexing proposal is described at
such a level of generality that it is difficult to know how it would
affect many common occurrences, including corporate distributions,
international transactions, installment sales and annuities.
It may prove necessary under any comprehensive indexing
scheme to require annual inflation adjustments to the basis of both
assets and debt. Most of these adjustments would probably have to
be reflected in current income, while others might be possible to
postpone until the disposition of the asset or indebtedness. The
Treasury's indexing proposal thus appears to contain too many diffi-
culties and uncertainties to be workable without extensive revision
and refinement. Even if the details of this proposal prove too prob-
lematic to implement in the current round of tax reform, however,
the Treasury is to be commended for recognizing the conceptually
appropriate solution to the mismeasurement of capital income and
expenses during periods of inflation and for beginning a serious dis-
cussion on problems of its implementation.
The Treasury proposal, to a far greater extent than the Bradley-
Gephardt and Kemp-Kasten bills, addresses the timing problems
that result from the mismatching of income and deductions. The
Treasury would respond to these problems by moving toward a sys-
tem of economic depreciation, 76 by requiring that most businesses
76. Id. at 152-72.
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use the accrual method of accounting for tax purposes, 77 and by re-
pealing a number of provisions that allow the accelerated amortiza-
tion, or the immediate deduction, of special categories of
expenditures (such as the costs of oil, gas and mineral exploration
and development)7 s
Other timing issues remain unresolved even under the Treasury
proposal. For example, the Treasury would continue to "step-up"
to fair market value the basis of assets held at death. 79 This rule
exempts permanently from income tax any appreciation that oc-
curred while the property was held by the decedent and therefore
may encourage elderly taxpayers to retain property that could be
put to more productive use elsewhere in the economy. The solution
to this problem might be either to require the new owner of the
asset to "carry over" the basis of the decedent80 or, better still, to
tax any unrealized appreciation at the time of the owner's death.8 '
Indeed, this may be an appropriate time to reconsider more gener-
ally the current rule that subjects to tax only those gains and losses
that have been realized.8 2
77. Id. at 215-17. The Bradley-Gephardt and Kemp-Kasten proposals would likewise
limit the use of the cash method of accounting. Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at § 413;
Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at § 411.
78. See, e.g., 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 232-33 (repeal of expensing of
intangible drilling costs); 234-35 (repeal of expensing of hard mineral exploration and
development costs); 236-37 (repeal of expensing of qualified tertiary injectant ex-
penses); 240-41 (repeal of mining and solid waste reclamation and closing cost deduc-
tion); 299-313 (repeal of rapid amortization for trademark and trade name expenditures,
pollution-control facilities, child-care facilities, rehabilitation of low-income housing,
railroad rolling stock, railroad grading and tunnel bores, soil and water conservation
expenditures, fertilizer and soil conditioning expenditures, land clearing expenditures
and reforestation expenditures).
79. See I.R.C. § 1014 (1982).
80. In 1976, Congress applied the carryover-basis rules to appreciated property
transferred at death. The complexities and technical difficulties that haunted this provi-
sion from the outset delayed its effective date and ultimately helped to bring about its
demise in 1980. It seems unlikely that Congress would attempt to re-enact a carryover-
basis rule so soon after this unhappy experience. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-455, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1520, 1872, deferred by Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
600, § 515, 92 Stat. 1763, 1883, repealed by Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401, 94 Stat. 229, 299.
81. See Graetz, Taxation of Unrealized Gains at Death-An Evaluation of the Current Propos-
als, 59 VA. L. REV. 830 (1973). Cf Covey, Possible Changes in the Basis Rule for Property
Transferred by Gift or at Death, 50 TAXES 831 (1972) (proposal by American Bankers Asso-
ciation Trust Division for additional estate tax on appreciation).
82. The realization requirement has already been abandoned with respect to the
treatment of certain commodity-straddle arrangements and hedging transactions with
stock options. See I.R.C. §§ 1092, 1256 (West Supp. 1984). Indeed, even Henry Simons
recognized in 1938 that
[s]ometimes it may become feasible to place even less reliance on the realization
criterion. Perhaps taxpayers might be required decennially to report their taxable
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IV. The Corporate Income Tax
A few years ago, Lily Tomlin played the leading role in an abomi-
nable movie called The Incredible Shrinking Woman. 83 In terms of na-
tional tax policy, the corporate income tax has been playing a
similar role in an equally bad entertainment. In 1953, the corporate
income tax accounted for 28.4 percent of federal revenue and 5.4
percent of the gross national product. 84 In 1983, after the most re-
cent liberalization of depreciation allowances, the corporate tax was
estimated to account for only 6.6 percent of federal revenues and
1.3 percent of GNP.85 The current corporate tax has not been pro-
jected to produce more than about 10 percent of federal revenues in
any future year.86 The individual income tax, by contrast, has ac-
counted for a relatively steady percentage of federal revenue and
GNP over the past thirty years-45.2 percent of federal revenues
and 8.6 percent of GNP in 1953, as compared to 47.2 percent of
revenues and 8.9 percent of GNP in 1983.87
The tax-reform proposals may portend an enlarged role for the
corporate income tax. For example, the Treasury projected that
under its original proposal, which was designed to be revenue-
neutral overall, individual income-tax receipts would eventually be
8.5 percent lower than they would have been under current law
while corporate receipts would be about 24 percent higher.88 A fur-
ther increase in the corporate tax burden may become particularly
appealing to the Reagan Administration, notwithstanding its philo-
sophical aversion to taxing corporations, as it increasingly finds it-
self caught between its need to reduce soaring federal deficits and
its campaign promises not to raise individual income taxes.
Another modern trend in corporate taxation has been the wide
incomes as though all property were disposed of at estimated fair market values as
of that year. Ultimately, this reconciliation might be made annually ...
H. SIMONS, supra note 25, at 167.
83. THE INCREDIBLE SHRINKING WOMAN (Universal 1981). See also THE INCREDIBLE
SHRINKING MAN (Universal-International 1957).
84. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREAS-
URY ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR 1953, at 616-17 (1954).
85. U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
FISCAL YEAR 1985, at 9-5, 9-60 (1984).
86. Id.
87. Compare U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, supra note 84, at 616-17, with U.S. OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, supra note 85, at 9-47, 9-60.
88. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 44. The Administration has since acknowl-
edged even more explicitly that its final tax proposal will increase the total amount of
taxes collected from corporations in order to finance the lowering of tax rates for indi-
viduals. See Birnbaum, Baker Says Corporations Will Pay More So That Individual Tax Rates
Can Fall, Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1985, at 64, col. 1.
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variation in effective tax rates both among industries and among
companies within the same industry. Alan Auerbach recently esti-
mated, for example, that the effective rate of corporate tax ranged
from a low of negative 20.2 percent for the water transportation in-
dustry to a high of 37.1 percent for the industry composed of water
supply, sanitary services and certain utilities. 89 Wholesale trade cor-
porations were subject to an estimated 8.3 percent rate of corporate
tax, while retail trade corporations were subject to a rate of 23.5
percent. 90 There are similar disparities in effective tax rates among
members of the same industry that have different investment, fi-
nancing or accounting practices.
The disparities among industries are largely attributable to the
combination of accelerated depreciation 9' and the investment tax
credit 92 and to the extent of debt financing within the industry. Ac-
celerated depreciation and the investment credit, designed in large
part to ameliorate the effects of inflation, have reduced the corpo-
rate tax burden on capital-intensive industries relative to labor-in-
tensive industries. Tax burdens may also vary depending upon the
mix of property used by the industry; for example, industries that
invest primarily in equipment are often taxed at a lower effective
rate than are industries that invest primarily in buildings or
inventory. 9
3
Disparate tax rates at the company level, as opposed to the indus-
try level, result in part from variations in each company's history of
gains and losses. This history depends, in turn, on whether the com-
pany has been able to take advantage of accelerated depreciation
and the investment credit. Several unintegrated companies may
have the same combined taxable income as a single conglomerate
but pay a higher corporate income tax; that is because the conglom-
erate may elect to file a consolidated return, which permits the tax
losses of one subsidiary to offset the tax gains of another.94 This
disparate treatment may encourage economically inefficient mergers
89. Auerbach, The Corporation Income Tax, in THE PROMISE OF TAX REFORM, ch. 3, at
12 J. Pechman ed. 1985). See also Reich, Reflections on Boundaries: A Reply to Charles Reich,
2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 204, 205-06 (1984) (citing disparate tax rates among industries).
90. Auerbach, supra note 89.
91. See I.R.C. § 168 (1982).
92. See I.R.C. §§ 38, 46 (West Supp. 1984).
93. See 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 156 ("ACRS disproportionately benefits
capital-intensive industries and methods of production. Income from sectors of the
economy without significant investment in depreciable property typically face higher ef-
fective tax rates.").
94. See I.R.C. §§ 1501-04 (1982).
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and acquisitions as well as economically inefficient transactions,
such as leasing, among unaffiliated companies.
Variations in financing patterns among companies-especially in
their use of debt versus equity financing-also produce variations in
their relative tax burdens. The corporate income tax traditionally
has favored debt over equity financing by providing that interest
paid on indebtedness is deductible to the company95 while divi-
dends paid on equity are not. This preference has been exacerbated
by the asymmetrical taxation of assets and loans that has resulted
from the failure of the income tax to respond systematically to infla-
tion. 96 Meanwhile, the government has repeatedly proved incapa-
ble of imposing clear rules to distinguish between debt and equity. 9
7
The disparate tax burdens among industries, and among compa-
nies within a single industry, have produced enormous misalloca-
tions of resources that cannot be explained as any sort of coherent
national industrial policy. Instead, investment capital has been
shifted from industry to industry, from company to company, for
little purpose but to achieve the greatest tax benefits. As the Treas-
ury has observed, these "tax-induced distortions in the use of labor
and capital and in consumer choices have severe costs in terms of
lower productivity, lost production and reduced consumer satisfac-
tion." 9 8 Indeed, Auerbach has calculated that differential corporate
taxation resulted in 1984 in the waste of 3.25 percent of the nation's
95. See I.R.C. § 163 (1982).
96. See supra text accompanying notes 53-62. It is probably not surprising that econ-
omists differ widely in their estimates of the extent to which the tax on corporate capital
income is distorted by inflation. This divergence of views results from their varying as-
sumptions about the marginal tax rates applicable to recipients of corporate interest
payments. In terms of aggregate impact, for example, Feldstein and Summers, who as-
sume high marginal rates on creditors, have estimated a 3.3% increase in the total effec-
tive corporate tax rate for each 1 percent rise in the inflation rate. See Feldstein &
Summers, Inflation and the Taxation of Capital Income in the Corporate Sector, Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 312 (1979). King and Fullerton, who as-
sumed a lower tax on creditors, estimated only a 0.4% increase in the total effective
corporate tax rate for each 1% rise in the inflation rate. See THE TAXATION OF INCOME
FROM CAPITAL: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, SWE-
DEN, AND WEST GERMANY 296 (M. King & D. Fullerton eds. 1984).
97. See J. EUSTICE, BITKER AND EUSTICE's FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 4.05 (Supp. No. 2 1984) (detailing difficulties in promulgat-
ing regulations under I.R.C. § 385 to distinguish stock from debt). The proposed
regulations were first issued in March 1980 (some 11 years after enactment of section
385) and were then revised and reissued in December 1981; the effective date of the
regulations was repeatedly delayed, and the regulations ultimately were withdrawn in
July 1983. The author concludes that "it seems most likely that the entire project will be
scrapped, and that the Treasury will recommend repeal of § 385 (thus returning the
definitional problem to the place from whence it came-the courts)." Id.
98. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
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capital stock for a one-time "social loss" of roughly $75 billion. 99
The Treasury would reduce these inefficiencies by replacing the
current Accelerated Cost Recovery System, investment tax credit
and capital gains preference with systematic inflation adjustments of
assets,' 0 0 inventories' 0 ' and debt'0 2 and with a "Real Cost Recovery
System" intended to more nearly reflect economic depreciation.' 0 3
The Kemp-Kasten and the Bradley-Gephardt bills would likewise re-
quire a more gradual recovery of the costs of depreciable property
than is permitted by current law; Kemp-Kasten would index depre-
ciation deductions, while Bradley-Gephardt would not. 0 4
The adoption of a system of economic depreciation, including ap-
propriate adjustments for inflation, and the repeal of the investment
credit would reduce the tax benefits of investing in capital instead of
labor, or in one category of asset instead of another. These changes
would thereby reduce the influence of the corporate tax on eco-
nomic decision-making as well as the disparities among industries in
the taxation of corporate income.
The reform proposals have been somewhat less ambitious in at-
tacking the structural provisions that may produce disparate tax
burdens at the company level. For example, the proposals fail to
consider the inequities and inefficiencies that may result from al-
lowing consolidated companies to offset their losses from one busi-
ness against their income from another. These problems could be
addressed either by preventing or limiting the use of consolidated
returns, so that each company would be taxed separately regardless
99. Auerbach, supra note 89, at 14.
100. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 178-88.
101. Id. at 189-92.
102. Id. at 193-200.
103. The Real Cost Recovery System would assign assets to one of seven classes for
depreciation purposes. Each RCRS class would be given a fixed percentage-ranging
from 32% to 3%-that would be applied each year to the inflation-adjusted basis of the
asset. Id. at 152-72.
104. The Bradley-Gephardt "Simplified Cost Recovery System" would apply 250%
declining balance depreciation to six classes of property with recovery periods ranging
from four years to 40 years. The deductions would not be adjusted for inflation. Brad-
ley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at § 301. The Kemp-Kasten "Neutral Cost Recovery System"
would apply straight-line depreciation (with only a partial deduction allowed in the year
that the property is placed in service) to the five existing classes of ACRS property;
however, what is currently three-year recovery property would be depreciable over four
years; five-year property would be depreciable over six years, 10-year property over 15
years, 15-year public utility property over 20 years, and 18-year real property over 25
years. The amount of the deduction would be adjusted for inflation annually. Kemp-
Kasten, supra note 4, at § 301. NCRS is intended to be the equivalent of expensing
assuming a 3.5% rate of inflation; however, the system would produce less revenue loss
than ACRS because deductions are not "front-loaded." Timberlake, Congressional Tax
Reform Leaders Reintroduce Reform Bills, 26 TAx NOTES 400, 401 (1985).
Yale Law & Policy Review
of the identity of its controlling shareholders, or, as some have pro-
posed, by allowing the refund or transfer of tax losses, so that unaf-
filiated companies would not be induced to engage in unproductive
mergers or other activity to obtain the same tax advantages available
to members of consolidated groups. 10 5 It has also been proposed
that new restrictions be imposed on the carryover of net operating
losses following a corporate acquisition.'
0 6
The disparate treatment of debt and equity that exists under cur-
rent law-and that persists to a varying degree under each of the
reform proposals-may reflect some continuing uncertainty about
the role of the corporate income tax. One view is that corporations
should be treated as separate taxpaying entities with an ability to
pay taxes that is independent of the collective taxpaying ability of
their shareholders. The other view is that corporations should be
treated as mere conduits through which income flows to their share-
holders; the sole purpose of the corporate income tax, according to
this view, is to prevent undistributed corporate earnings from escap-
ing taxation under the individual income tax.'
0 7
Those who subscribe to the conduit theory find it theoretically
inappropriate to tax corporations on earnings that are distributed to
shareholders as dividends. That is because dividends, when subject
to tax once at the corporate level and again at the shareholder level,
are taxed more heavily than other kinds of individual income. By the
same token, undistributed corporate earnings are improperly taxed
whenever the corporation's effective tax rate differs from the collec-
tive rate of its shareholders. The theoretically proper reform from
this perspective would be to repeal the separate corporate tax and
to attribute undistributed corporate income directly to shareholders
for taxation at their marginal rates. Any remaining corporate tax
would be only a withholding tax that would be credited to share-
holders as corporate income was distributed or attributed to
105. See, e.g. Campisano & Romano, Recouping Losses: The Case for Full Loss Offsets, 76
Nw. U. L. REV. 709 (1981). Proposals for the transfer or refund of tax losses would, of
course, pose additional costs for the government and inefficiencies for the national
economy (such as enabling unprofitable corporations to remain in business for longer
periods).
106. Congress amended section 382 in 1976 to impose a strict continuity-of-owner-
ship test on loss carryovers in acquisitions but has not yet permitted the amendment to
take effect. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 806, 90 Stat. 1520, 1598,
amending I.R.C. §§ 382 and 383. For discussion of later developments, see ABA Tai
Section Resolves to Broaden Tax Base, Limit NOL Carryovers, 26 TAx NOTES 512, 513-14
(1985).
107. These two perspectives are described inJ. PECHMAN, supra note 19, at 129-30.





There are both political and practical obstacles, however, to such
"full integration" of the individual and corporate income taxes.
The repeal of the corporate income tax might prove unacceptable to
the large segment of the public that believes that a portion of the
federal tax burden should be borne by corporations as entities.' 09
Moreover, many commentators consider it impractical to impute
and tax retained corporate earnings to shareholders. They have
urged, as a second-best solution, the repeal of the corporate tax on
earnings distributed to shareholders as dividends."t 0 This could be
accomplished by either a corporate deduction for dividends distrib-
uted or a shareholder credit for corporate taxes paid."'
These proposals have heretofore encountered considerable
resistance among corporate managers, who prefer that any corpo-
rate tax reductions be focused on retained earnings rather than dis-
tributed earnings. They have therefore advanced, with the
concurrence of the economics profession, various bang-for-the-buck
arguments regarding the likely impact of corporate tax reductions as
an investment stimulus. 112 This has previously resulted in the rejec-
tion of both dividend relief and general corporate rate reductions in
favor of investment credits and liberalized depreciation allowances.
The Treasury blames the "double taxation" of dividends for
skewing corporate financing decisions away from equity and in favor
of riskier debt, inducing the retention of earnings in marginally pro-
ductive activities, discouraging investment in the corporate sector as
108. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 3, at 69; C. McLURE, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE
TAXED TWICE? 146-84 (1979); Warren, The Relation and Integration of the Individual and
Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 719, 739-41 (1981).
109. See Goode, supra note 35, at 26. The author observes:
For most people, corporations are real entities, not legal fictions or veils. It follows
that the majority think that corporations should pay their "fair" share of taxes,
though that is not precisely defined. . . .Popular attitudes do not necessarily op-
pose some alleviation of the tax burden on dividends or other distributions.
Id. See also N.Y. Times, March 31, 1985, § 4, at 2, col. 1 (quoting Rep. Dan Rostenkowski,
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, as remarking that "[w]hen corpora-
tions can be viewed as enjoying a profit in the neighborhood of $2 or $3 billion and not
paying taxes, that is when the revolution comes in").
110. See, e.g., C. McLURE, supra note 108, at 42-44.
111. The various proposals are described in Graetz, Dividend Relief Via Shareholder
Credits, 7 TAX NOTES 667 (1978). Cf American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Pro-
ject: Tentative Draft No. 2, at 48 (1979) (proposal for dividend relief limited to new
equity).
112. Similar arguments have been advanced by the National Association of Manufac-
turers with respect to the 1984 Treasury proposal. See Tax Reform: Economists Applaud
Long-Term Impact of Treasury Plan; Business Groups Disagree, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), March
29, 1985, at G-7.
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well as savings generally, and encouraging participation in tax-shel-
ter partnerships." l3 The Treasury therefore has proposed a half-
way solution that would allow corporations a deduction equal to 50
percent of all dividends distributed to their shareholders."t 4 The
decision not to provide full relief from double taxation was report-
edly motivated by considerations of revenue loss."15
An alternative to allowing the deduction of corporate dividends
would be to restrict the deduction of corporate interest expenses.
This approach would address many of the problems at which the
dividend deduction is directed at a lower cost to the federal fisc.
VI. Tax Shelters and Tax Arbitrage
The steady rise of tax-shelter activity since the 1960s has placed
great stress upon the current income tax. The Treasury has noted,
for example, that the number of taxpayers claiming losses from
partnerships, the most common vehicle for tax-shelter investments,
increased almost five-fold, to 2.1 million, between 1963 and
1982.116
Tax-shelter investments typically have at least one of four ele-
ments that contribute to tax reduction: (1) deferral of tax through
acceleration of deductions or postponement of income;" 7 (2) con-
version, which occurs when the costs of an investment are deductible
from ordinary income while the gain, if taxable at all, is taxed at
lower rates (typically capital-gain rates);" 8 (3) leverage, which in-
creases deferral and conversion by increasing deductible
amounts;" l9 and (4) income shifting, which involves structuring trans-
113. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 118-19.
114. Id. See also 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 134-4.
115. 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 119.
116. Id. at 138.
117. Examples of the provisions of the current income tax that allow deferral include
the immediate deduction for the intangible oil and gas drilling costs that should more
appropriately be capitalized and recovered over a number of years; the Accelerated Cost
Recovery System, which permits depreciation deductions in excess of true economic de-
preciation; and current deductions for the costs of earning farm income that will not be
reported until a later taxable year. See I.R.C. §§ 263(c) (intangible drilling expenses),
168 (Accelerated Cost Recovery System); 180 (expenditures by farmers for fertilizer,
etc.); 182 (expenditures by farmers for clearing land) (1982).
118. The current income tax contains rules requiring that some gains on the sale of
capital assets be treated as ordinary income rather than capital gain to the extent of
prior depreciation deductions taken against ordinary income. However, these "recap-
ture" rules do not prevent all conversion of ordinary income into capital gain, especially
on investments in real estate. Compare I.R.C. § 1245 (recapture rules for depreciable
personal property and some real property) with I.R.C. § 1250 (recapture rules for cer-
tain depreciable real property) (1982).
119. The use of borrowed funds to obtain increased deductions arises in part from
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actions to ensure that income, deductions or credits will be allo-
cated among taxpayers in the manner that produces the lowest net
tax liability. 1
20
The failure of the tax law to respond systematically to inflation
has contributed to this proliferation of tax shelters. Congress's ad
hoc solutions to the overtaxation of assets in inflationary periods,
combined with its neglect of the undertaxation of debt, have ena-
bled taxpayers to achieve negative tax rates by combining borrow-
ing with accelerated deductions or income postponements or
exclusions. As a result, taxpayers have been encouraged to engage
in certain categories of investments, regardless of whether they are
economically viable, and have received after-tax profits on invest-
ments that produced little or no profit before tax.
Tax-shelter investments are typically associated with a form of tax
arbitrage whereby an individual simultaneously engages in debt and
asset transactions where the asset is eligible for favorable tax treat-
ment. This occurs not only when taxpayers invest in what are com-
monly perceived to be tax shelters but also when they buy homes
financed by mortgages or hold a combination of debt and tax-pre-
ferred retirement savings. As noted above, a different form of tax
arbitrage occurs where undertaxed assets are held by taxpayers sub-
ject to high marginal rates, while overtaxed assets (such as loans that
produce taxable interest) are held by low-bracket taxpayers and tax-
exempt entities.
1 21
Some commentators believe that the growth of tax shelters in re-
cent years may be attributable not only to the provisions of the In-
ternal Revenue Code but also to the increased unpopularity of the
income tax that resulted from bracket creep and other effects of in-
the rule of Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947) (amount realized on sale of prop-
erty includes mortgage as well as equity). Some inroads have recently been made on the
Crane doctrine, such as the disallowance of deductions where loans are nonrecourse,
where loans exceed the value of the related assets, and where repayment is considered
unduly contingent. See I.R.C. § 465 (1982) (taxpayers cannot deduct losses on non-real
estate investments in excess of amount by which they are "at risk" with respect to the
activity); Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976) (basis does
not include mortgage where loan is significantly in excess of fair market value of the
property); Gibson Products Co. v. United States, 637 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1981) (contin-
gent nature of obligation prevents inclusion in basis of oil and gas leases of nonrecourse
debt secured by leases, drilling equipment and percentage of future production).
120. Leasing transactions, see supra note 60, are one form of income-shifting that has
often been used in tax shelters. Another is the special allocation of partnership losses
among partners in different tax brackets. See M. GRAETZ, supra note 59, at ch. 4; McKee,
Nelson & Whitmire, Allocating Tax Benefits: An Analysis of the Proposed Section 704(b) Regula-
tions, 36 MAJOR TAx PLAN. 25-1 (1984).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 57-62.
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flation.122 The problem has been exacerbated by the difficulties of
the Internal Revenue Service in policing even those tax shelters that
have no adequate basis in law or fact. The IRS has conducted too
few audits and has only recently acquired the computer capability to
identify potentially abusive tax shelters.123
Until the 1982 legislation, even those taxpayers whose tax-shelter
deductions were ultimately disallowed by the IRS could enjoy in the
interim the equivalent of a below-market government loan with
none of the financial-statement impact or the time-consuming
paperwork demanded by other institutional lenders. It was neces-
sary only that they avoid a fraud penalty. Many attorneys routinely
provided such taxpayers with "fraud insurance" in the form of tax-
shelter opinion letters.
The 1982 Act contained new compliance provisions that were ex-
pected to account for a substantial share of the total revenue to be
raised by this largest peacetime tax increase in the nation's his-
tory. 124 The 1984 tax legislation strengthened some of these provi-
sions and adopted additional ones.i 25 It is still too early to ascertain
how significant will be the impact of this legislation on tax-shelter
activity.
The elimination of tax shelters is a major goal of the three tax-
reform proposals. All three proposals seem to assume that reducing
marginal rates will reduce incentives to invest in tax shelters. 126
122. See supra text accompanying note 52.
123. See Murray, IRS Is Losing Battle Against Tax Evaders Despite Its New Gear, Wall St. J.,
April 10, 1984, at 1, col. 6. The article observes that
IRS audits, which many tax experts consider the most effective weapon against tax
cheating, will decline this year to 1.36% of all returns from 1.5% last year. The
agency's stagnant budgets have taken a heavy toll on IRS manpower in recent years,
and audit coverage has dwindled steadily from a rate of about 5% in the 1960s.
Id,
124. See, e.g., Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§§ 611 (penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters), 612 (action to enjoin promoters of
abusive tax shelters), 613 (penalty for substantial understatement of tax liability), 615
(penalty for aiding and abetting understatement of tax liability), 616 (fraud penalty),
I.R.C. §§ 6700, 7408, 6661, 6701, 6653 (1982). The compliance provisions were ex-
pected to generate $3.4 billion of an anticipated total of $18.0 billion in 1983, $8.9
billion of an anticipated $37.7 billion in 1984, and $8.7 billion of an anticipated $42.7
billion in 1985. H.R. CON. REP. No. 97-760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 691, reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 781, 1454.
125. See, e.g., Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 141 (registration
of tax shelters) 142 (originator of tax shelter must keep list of investors), 143 (increased
penalty for promoting tax shelters), 144 (increased interest rate on substantial under-
payments attributable to certain tax-motivated transactions), I.R.C. §§ 6111, 6112, 6700
(as amended),,6621 (as amended) (West Supp. 1984).
126. See, e.g., 1 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 64 ("rate reduction ... will re-




There is little empirical support for this proposition, however. A
rate reduction may not reduce the number of individuals who par-
ticipate in tax shelters although it will reduce the benefits that each
individual can derive from such activity. Recall, for example, that
investment in tax shelters continued to increase after the 1969 and
1981 reductions in the top marginal rate 127 and after the enactment
of the "at risk" rules of Section 465, which substantially reduced the
ratio of tax savings to cash investment that could be obtained from
most tax shelters other than real estate.'
28
The tax-reform proposals contain a number of specific provisions
for reducing the benefits of tax shelters. For example, all three pro-
posals would eliminate conversion advantages by taxing the capital
gains of individual at the same rate as ordinary income.' 29 All
would also reduce many deferral opportunities by requiring the
costs of depreciable property to be recovered at a less accelerated
rate 130 and by repealing the particularly favorable treatment pro-
vided under current law for oil, gas and mineral exploration and
development. 13
In addition, the proposals would reduce the advantages of lever-
age and tax arbitrage by limiting the amount of non-business inter-
est expense that could be used to offset unrelated income. 132 For
example, the Treasury would allow individual taxpayers to deduct
only mortgage interest on a principal residence plus investment and
127. The top marginal rate was reduced to 50% on earned income in 1969 (effective
in 1971) and to 50% on all income in 1981. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
172, § 804, 83 Stat. 509, 752; Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34,
§ 101, 95 Stat. 172, 176-85, I.R.C. § 1 (1982).
128. Section 465 allows the taxpayer to deduct non-business losses only to the ex-
tent that he is "at risk" with respect to the activity in which the losses were incurred. A
taxpayer is considered "at risk" with respect to his cash investment and indebtedness on
which he is personally liable; he is not considered "at risk" with respect to nonrecourse
indebtedness, which permits the lender to recover against the mortgaged property but
not against the borrower personally. In the absence of section 465, a taxpayer could, for
example, acquire depreciable property by paying $100 in cash and taking out a $900
mortgage on the property. He could then recover the entire $1,000 purchase price
through depreciation deductions; under section 465, however, the taxpayer could re-
cover only $100. Thus, it has been said that section 465 reduces to one-to-one the ratio
of tax benefit to cash outlay for most investments other than real estate. I.R.C. § 465
(1982).
129. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 181; Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at
§ 241; Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at § 232.
130. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 152-72; Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at
§ 301; Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at § 301.
131. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 223-42; Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at
§ 311; Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at § 311.
132. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 331-33; Bradley-Gephardt, supra note 4, at
§ 232; Kemp-Kasten, supra note 4, at § 228.
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other personal interest expenses to the extent of their net invest-
ment income plus $5,000.
The Treasury proposal goes beyond the Bradley-Gephardt and
Kemp-Kasten bills in imposing additional restrictions on tax-shelter
activity. For example, Treasury would close a large loophole in Sec-
tion 465 by extending the "at risk" rules for loss deductions to all
investments, including real estate.' 33 The Treasury would also limit
the ability of limited partnerships to "pass through" their tax losses
to shelter their investors' income from other sources. Large limited
partnerships (defined as those with more than 35 limited partners)
would be taxed as corporations so that their gains and losses would
have to be taken into account at the entity level.' 3
4
To assume that the foregoing provisions would be sufficient to
eliminate all tax shelters, however, would be to underestimate the
ingenuity of taxpayers and their attorneys. It is inevitable that the
enactment of these provisions would be followed by new forms of
tax avoidance. For example, the Treasury has recognized that, if
home-mortgage interest was deductible but other non-business in-
terest was not, taxpayers would attempt to mortgage their homes to
the maximum extent possible in order to obtain funds whose repay-
ment would give rise to interest deductions. The Treasury has con-
sequently proposed to limit the amount of a taxpayer's mortgage for
purposes of interest deduction to the fair market value of his home
and to trace debt to insure that it is not the result of mortgage over-
statement.1 35 These rules are likely to prove difficult for the IRS to
enforce, however.
The reform plans fail to consider a more comprehensive response
to the tax-shelter problem that was first advanced in 1973 by Treas-
ury Secretary George P. Shultz. This "limitation on artifical losses"
proposal would prevent taxpayers from using their deductions from
tax-shelter investments to offset their income from salaries, business
profits and other unrelated activities.' 36 This approach now is
133. 2 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 334-35.
134. Id. at 146-50.
135. Id. at 332.
136. See Hearings on General Tax Reform before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 6985-86 (1973) (testimony of Treasury Secretary George P. Shultz).
The proposal would have limited the deduction of "artificial accounting losses"-that is,
losses attributable to an accelerated deduction that "clearly relates to some future ex-
pected profit ahd has little or no relation to income reported in the current year"--to
the associated net related income for the taxable year. Losses that could not be deducted
in one year could be carried over to succeeding years.
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found in the minimum tax rules that limit interest deductions 37 and
in rules for so-called hobby losses' 38 and vacation homes.139
VII. Tax Compliance Problem
No effort to discuss the income tax today would be complete with-
out at least a cursory examination of compliance problems. A large
revenue gap, estimated to be in the range of $100 billion and grow-
ing, has resulted from a combination of unreported income and
overstated deductions. '
40
Unreported taxable income has averaged an estimated 10 to 15
percent of total taxable income in recent years, and IRS commis-
sioners seem convinced that the rate of noncompliance has been
growing dramatically. For example, Commissioner Roscoe L. Egger,
Jr., has reported that the "income tax gap" created by revenues lost
from legal sources of income grew from $29 billion in 1973 to $87
billion in 1981 and, without the 1982 legislation, was expected to
grow to $120 billion in 1985.141 Shocking estimates are also offered
of income tax evasion in the illegal sector. 1
42
It is surprising in light of the prevailing sanction and detection
structure that anyone who behaved strategically would have paid in-
come tax during the past decade so long as they could have avoided
fraud penalties. The most rudimentary cost-benefit analysis of a de-
cision whether to under-report taxable income suggests that, if a
sanction structure is to have any deterrent effect, either the
probability of punishment must approach 100 percent or the pen-
alty must be greater than the cheater's benefit. During the past dec-
ade, while aggregate audit probabilities were typically closer to 2
percent than 100 percent, 43 interest rates on understated tax liabil-
ities were often less than market rates. The income tax can still be
viewed-even after recent efforts to strengthen the sanction and de-
137. I.R.C. § 55(e)(4) (1982) (limiting interest deduction to interest incurred in fi-
nancing the taxpayer's home plus an amount equal to net investment income).
138. I.R.C. § 183 (1982) (activity not engaged in for profit can give rise to deduc-
tions only to the extent that it generates income).
139. I.R.C. § 280A (1982) (extending hobby-loss rules to deduction of expenses as-
sociated with residences used for both personal and rental purposes).
140. Tax Compliance Act of 1982 and Related Legislation: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1982) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski)
[hereinafter cited as Tax Compliance Hearings].
141. Id. at 5 (statement of Commissioner Egger).
142. Illegal-sector noncompliance was estimated to account for $8 billion in lost tax
revenues in 1981. Id.
143. See note 123, supra.
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tection structure-as a game that favors significantly those who un-
derreport their taxable income.
The compliance gap has become a justification not only for new
enforcement measures but also for major substantive proposals
such as the reduction of tax rates and the replacement of the income
tax with a consumption tax. It is difficult to analyze the compliance
implications of these proposals because relatively little theoretical
and empirical knowledge is currently available concerning the na-
ture and extent of the compliance problem. 144 What knowledge we
do have suggests, however, that this problem will not be solved by
merely lowering tax rates or modifying the tax base without address-
ing the structural issues of detection and punishment. Yet, the
three tax-reform proposals contain no new provisions to encourage
citizens to meet their tax obligations fully and promptly.
The notion that lowering tax rates will induce greater compliance
stems, at least in part, from the notion that underreporting will pro-
duce lesser benefits at lower rates of tax. However, lower tax rates
will also reduce the costs of underreporting-at least where the
fraud penalty is not applicable-so that the taxpayer's cost-benefit
calculation may remain unchanged. It seems important that favora-
bly taxed capital gains, which are subject to a top rate of 20 percent,
currently account for a significant portion of unreported income
from legal sources.14
5
The costs of auditing tax returns and collecting unpaid taxes
would probably remain the same after the rate reduction, 146 so the
government would have to expend the same resources to collect
fewer unpaid taxes (or to expend more resources to collect the same
amount of taxes). The government might conclude that these re-
sources would be used more productively elsewhere. The rate re-
144. The economics-based literature on crime and punishment has made little pro-
gress since the basic theoretical structure was established nearly two decades ago by
Gary S. Becker. See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169 (1968). In this framework, criminal activity is treated as a rational decision based
upon probabilities of detection and conviction and levels of punishment. For an applica-
tion of these models to tax evasion and avoidance, see, e.g., Allingham & Sandmo, In-
come Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. EcoN. 323 (1972).
145. See Tax Compliance Hearings, supra note 140, at 14 (capital gains estimated by
Commissioner Egger to account for more than 10% of the compliance gap). This esti-
mate is consistent with Henry's finding that "the overwhelming share of noncompliance
with respect to legal source income appears to involve business and property income"
and to involve upper-bracket taxpayers. Henry, supra note 52, at 6.
146. See Graetz, Reinganum & Wilde, An Equilibrium Model of Tax Compliance
with a Bayesian Auditor and Some "Honest" Taxpayers (forthcoming); Graetz, Rein-




duction might therefore lead to fewer enforcement activities and
therefore to greater, rather than lesser, noncompliance.
In summary, it is clear that compliance is a serious problem under
the current income tax. This problem demands attention, both at
the level of theory and the level of fact, in order to design better
compliance mechanisms and to improve those that already exist.
The notion embodied in the three reform proposals that compliance
problems will disappear if we but lower tax rates does not withstand
even this introductory analysis.
VIII. Conclusions
There is much cause for encouragement in the emerging consen-
sus for a modified flat-rate tax. This new interest in comprehensive
tax reform will have to be more than a passing political fad, how-
ever, for many obstacles remain to be surmounted before any
broad-based, low-rate income tax can be enacted into law.
Several important considerations should be borne in mind by
those who will participate in the debate over these tax-reform plans.
The first is that all three proposals, regardless of the political affilia-
tions of their authors, are more alike than they are different. They
all reject the view of some flat-tax proponents that income-tax re-
form should serve as a camouflage for shifting the tax burden from
higher- to lower-income taxpayers. They agree that the income tax
should be restructured rather than replaced by a consumption tax;
they recognize that the taxation of capital as well as labor is essential
to tax equity and is not unduly burdensome to economic efficiency
or economic growth.
The three proposals likewise agree on the necessity of repealing
or revising many of the tax preferences and structural provisions
that contribute to the complexity, unfairness and inefficiency of the
present Internal Revenue Code. They also agree that the current
income tax has failed to compensate appropriately for the effects of
inflation. The Treasury plan, in fact, offers a comprehensive alter-
native to the ad hoc responses to inflation that currently distort eco-
nomic decision-making and cause tax burdens to vary widely among
taxpayers with similar before-tax income.
None of these proposals, however, attempts to cure every ill af-
flicting the current income tax. For example, none of the proposals
addresses the problem of unrealized appreciation of assets trans-
ferred at death. In addition, the proposals largely ignore those rules
that encourage companies to alter their financing patterns, or to en-
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gage in mergers and acquisitions, purely for tax reasons; only the
Treasury would even begin the important task of integrating the
corporate and individual income taxes. The proposals address the
growing compliance gap merely by hoping that it will somehow go
away once tax rates are lowered; they offer no new provisions that
would significantly increase the costs incurred by taxpayers in play-
ing the "audit lottery."
Each of these tax-reform proposals should be examined not only
as a package but also section by section. Thus, one should evaluate
whether each new provision would enhance the simplicity, fairness
or economic neutrality of the income tax for particular groups of
taxpayers. This analysis may suggest that some of these provisions
should be enacted immediately, others should be rejected, and still
others should be delayed pending further study.
The relative importance of the three goals of simplicity, equity
and economic neutrality may vary for each of these provisions de-
pending on the category of taxpayers that would primarily be af-
fected by the change in the tax law. For example, simplicity may be
most desirable and most achievable in those provisions that would
affect the vast majority of working-class and middle-class taxpayers
whose incomes derive largely from wages, salaries, interest and divi-
dends. These concerns for simplicity may therefore justify, for ex-
ample, the elimination or reduction of deductions for state and local
taxes and for relatively small charitable contributions.
The goal of equity may take on greater importance with respect to
high-income individuals whose earnings derive from investments as
well as from labor. The tax law should attempt to ensure that these
individuals pay similar taxes regardless of the sources of their in-
come and that they pay appropriately greater taxes than those with
lower incomes. Considerations of fairnesss may therefore help to
justify, for example, the repeal of the capital-gains preference, the
limitations on the deduction of non-business interest expense, and
the elimination of the exemption for interest on private-purpose
bonds issued by state and local governments.
The goal of economic neutrality may be of paramount importance
with respect to the taxation of businesses, whose tax-motivated deci-
sions to enter into particular investments, transactions or relation-
ships otherwise may reverberate throughout the national economy.
These concerns may support, for example, the repeal of the invest-
ment tax credit, the use of depreciation schedules more closely
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linked to economic depreciation, and the indexing for inflation of
assets, inventories and debt.
The tax law cannot often promote simplicity, fairness and eco-
nomic neutrality within a single provision. It may be necessary for
simplicity to give way to equity and neutrality, for example, in taxing
those businesses and individual investors who hold different types
of property whose costs may be recovered according to different
schedules. It may be necessary at other times to give simplicity pri-
ority over equity, for example, by continuing to exempt from tax
certain de minimis fringe benefits that are provided to some working
people but not to others.
These tax-reform proposals must be evaluated in light of the
political and economic realities of the 1980s. One of these realities
is the existence of powerful special interests who have already de-
scended on Washington to protest many of the proposed changes.
Another is the projection of large federal deficits that are unlikely to
be reduced significantly by spending cuts alone. It is therefore more
difficult now than in the past to combine tax reduction with tax re-
form in order to make the entire package more appealing to
Congress.
This is not to suggest that tax reform should be abandoned
merely because it is difficult to accomplish. Rather, it is to empha-
size the importance of identifying and neutralizing the opposition to
tax reform. One approach might be expressly to combine tax reform
with deficit reduction and to emphasize that all taxpayers are being
called upon to give up their own tax benefits for the greater public
benefit. A vote for tax reform would then become a vote for a more
balanced federal budget rather than a vote against charities, oil pro-
ducers or capital-intensive industries.
A second approach might be to delay or to phase in those provi-
sions of a modified flat-rate tax that are expected to cause particu-
larly large losses for particularly vulnerable categories of taxpayers.
The transition to a modified flat-rate tax might be eased by ex-
panding upon the minimum-tax provisions of current law. 147 The
minimum tax has already satisfactorily resolved such major potential
147. For a more extensive discussion of how such a transition might be effected, see
Graetz, Minimum Tax, supra note 4. Cf Fuerbringer, Minimum Tax Level Proposal, N.Y.
Times, April 2, 1985, at DI, col. 3 (announcement by House Democrats of "fair share
minimum tax" proposal that would place "a minimum tax of 25 percent on individuals
and corporations with taxable income of $100,000 or more, even if their deductions
would reduce their tax to zero or less"). For a general discussion of alternative transition
rules in the tax law, see Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax
Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977).
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controversies as the treatment of capital gains, itemized deductions
and tax credits, and has partially resolved other important issues,
such as depletion and depreciation. The next step in the transition
might involve further broadening of the minimum-tax base by, for
example, the addition of interest on state and local bonds and life
insurance reserves, unrealized gains on assets transferred by death
and gift, and the excess of allowable depreciation over economic
depreciation.
Finally, one must bear in mind that that tax reform is necessarily a
continuing process. It is probably impossible to construct any modi-
fied flat tax that could correct all of the problems of the current
income tax and that would not at the same time create new
problems of its own. It is nonetheless important to begin today-
while the interest of policymakers and taxpayers in comprehensive
tax reform stands at its highest level in more than a decade-to
strengthen and restructure the federal income tax in ways that will
promote fairness, simplicity and economic efficiency.
Fortunately, this tax-reform effort will be able to build upon the
foundation of an income tax that, despite its flaws, has proved for
some seventy years to be a reasonably fair and efficient means of
financing the world's largest democratic government. Indeed, the
modified flat tax proposals recognize the essential soundness of the
income tax by proposing that it be reformed rather than replaced.
For, as Joe E. Brown said to Tony Curtis in Some Like It Hot, 148 after
learning to his great dismay that Curtis was a man pretending to be
a woman: "Well, nobody's perfect."
148. SOME LIKE IT HOT (United Artists/Mirisch 1959).
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